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Abstract 
This paper asks whether graph theory can help 
with measurement of informal economies, par-
ticularly for interactions between people that are 
not based on money, such as giving and sharing.  
This is followed by a discussion of factors that 
influence the possibility of measurement, such 
as property rights, types of goods, and collective 
forms of action.  A specific epistemology is of-
fered that can be used to inform longitudinal 
forms of economic measurement in preference 
to traditional exchange-based methods.  The pa-
per concludes with a call for network scientists 
to collaborate with economists and anthropolo-
gists to help create new interdisciplinary forms 
of measurement that recognise the messy and 
multiplex networks of our material social life.  
1 Introduction 
Measuring the activity in an economy is difficult.  This 
is true for economists measuring the modern nation 
state but it is also true for anthropologists involved with 
smaller communities.  The traditional form of measure-
ment takes money as the empirical object and ignores 
interactions between people that are harder to record, 
such as gift giving and sharing, where receipts are typ-
ically absent.  These activities are often referred to as 
part of the ‘informal’ side of the economy i.e. those ac-
tivities that people value outside of financial transac-
tions, but which are not regulated, monitored or evalu-
ated by the state.  The informal economy has received 
a wealth of academic attention over the past few dec-
ades largely due to the influence of anthropologists 
such as Geertz (1963) and Hart (1973).  
 
Estimates vary on the significance of the informal 
economy, from those that trivialise it to others that sug-
gest if it were to be measured financially it would ex-
ceed the value of the formal economy (Gibson-Gra-
ham, 1996).  Regardless of estimates, large parts of in-
formal economies remain unstudied because of the dif-
ficulty in recording non-monetary interactions between 
people.  This is a) a significant issue for policy makers 
that base decisions on the size or growth of economies, 
and b) a huge opportunity for researchers – particularly 
those that are capable of creating novel tools to capture 
and analyse new forms of data.  
The following paper draws on previous research into 
how the informal economy is increasingly being medi-
ated through digital communication (Harvey et al, 
2014a, 2014b).  The widespread availability of social 
networks has meant that data on people, goods and 
transactions can be modelled explicitly, where previ-
ously it was impossible (See for instance the compre-
hensive EU commission review on organisations in the 
‘sharing economy’ - Codagnone et al., 2016).  This 
suggests that data captured through social network 
analysis can provide novel opportunities, for econo-
mists and anthropologists alike, to influence policy.  
Despite often being concerned with different subject 
matter, economists and anthropologists (and economic 
anthropologists for that matter!) frequently study how 
people exchange resources in order that they can sub-
sequently describe the aggregate or macro state of the 
economy.  This emphasis on exchange, and more spe-
cifically the exchange of alienated property, has be-
come the basis of modern economics.  For example, 
gross domestic product (henceforth GDP) is used for 
comparing economies, and despite emphasising 
productivity it nonetheless is a measure of goods that 
are saleable.  Thus such an account misses any form of 
productivity that is not described in terms of money.  
This is a huge methodological issue that is chronically 
under-researched.   The following pages outline what 
such empirical measurement obscures, before outlining 
a preliminary sketch of an alternative approach.  The 
paper ends by calling for specialists of social network 
analysis to help invigorate this debate by constructing 
alternative measures of economic activity that capture 
the depth and breadth that exchange-centred ap-
proaches miss.  
2 Economic base and the possibility of 
exchange 
Economic anthropology is a field of study that con-
cerns itself with the production, consumption and cir-
culation of objects between people.   Implicitly then, 
the study involves thinking about how people think of 
themselves and how they think about the world around 
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them.   This raises some tricky questions of ontology 
and epistemology for any comparative method.   
The seminal work completed by economic anthropolo-
gists, such as Mauss (1950/2002) and Malinowski 
(1922/1992), considered the various ways that items 
circulate through societies and their associated moral 
purpose.  Later work by authors such as Polanyi 
(1944), Sahlins (1979) and Levi-Strauss (1949) in-
cluded greater consideration about what economic re-
lations could be described as fundamental, regardless 
of culture.  These are referred to here as ‘archetypal’ 
relationships, but there is still disagreement about 
which relations are actually archetypal.   Polanyi iden-
tified market exchange, reciprocity and redistribution 
as three different patterns for economic provisioning of 
material goods within societies.  He also recognised the 
significance of the way people pool resources together 
through institutions or kinship groups and referred to 
this as ‘householding’.   Each of these archetypes are 
relationships which in principle can be understood in 
graph theoretical terms as a directed graph, indeed Po-
lanyi spoke of degrees of ‘centricity’ and ‘symmetry’ 
being implicit in each respective form (1944, p.51).  In 
contrast, Levi-Strauss (1949/1969) and Sahlins (1979) 
both identified reciprocity as the basis of economic re-
lations.  Sahlins suggested that pooling should be con-
sidered as a special subset of reciprocal relations and 
described three forms of reciprocity: ‘general’, ‘bal-
anced’ and ‘negative’.  He suggested that each form of 
interaction is related to kinship i.e. how close or related 
people feel to each other, or as Sahlins (2012, p.28) 
puts it in later work as ‘mutuality of being’.  
  
The problem with the hypothesis that economic life is 
always premised upon reciprocity, albeit much of it 
‘generalised’ reciprocity is that it is difficult to falsify 
without a longitudinal dataset which encompasses all 
of the relations between people that could be termed 
‘economic’. Given that the economy is never simply 
localised, this means it is impossible to obtain the nec-
essary dataset and thus the hypothesis remains imper-
vious to analysis. Furthermore, any social scientific ap-
proach to human action which presupposes such an ep-
istemic claim, reduces all social interaction to ex-
change, either through individual ‘transactions’ or as 
an all-encompassing feature of culture at large. 
 
Each of the archetypal categories that Polanyi and 
Sahlins described can in principle be observed as em-
pirical events by social scientists.  Indeed, Sahlins de-
scribes a range of ethnographic studies in great depth, 
from across the globe, in order to justify distinct forms 
of reciprocity.  The problem with these basic arche-
types though, is that they do not reflect the real-world 
complexity that could be examined through longitudi-
nal empirical studies.  Furthermore, by describing all 
human relations in terms of ‘reciprocity’ this elimi-
nates the possibility to examine behaviour which is not 
motivated by consequential ethics, in other words it ig-
nores acts done for their own sake.   The question thus 
follows ‘to what extent can we define and compare cat-
egories of economic interaction’?  And, is it even pos-
sible to do so without reducing the discipline to relativ-
ism?  In the second half of the 20th century these ques-
tions pulled anthropology apart.  Some researchers, 
like Needham (1971), drew on Wittgensteinian notions 
of ‘family resemblance’ to question the universality of 
concepts like kinship, incest or marriage.  Others (e.g.  
Leach, 1961) questioned whether English patterns of 
thought can be translated into universal axioms.  They 
also cautioned against excessive empiricism with the 
aim of categorising social groups into types and sub-
types. 
 
Dominant schools of thought in the 20th century led to 
a focus on exchange as the main criterion of measure-
ment.  However, exchange relies on institutional sup-
port of private property.  It is extremely difficult to find 
any anthropological or historical evidence of sustained 
exchange between people without institutions that first 
establish property rights (Graeber, 2011). Furthermore, 
the right of ownership is, as various anthropologists de-
scribe (e.g. Hart, 2005) only made possible because of 
a shared access to goods which support the possibility 
of individual appropriation.  This undercarriage of 
goods is typically referred to as ‘base’ or infrastructure, 
because it quite literally supports the possibility of 
higher, more nuanced and individualised property 
rights (Gudeman, 2008).  
To illustrate this point it is worth first considering the 
types of goods that can be said to exist and the property 
rights that are made possible by virtue of human rela-
tions to goods.  Rather than analyse the simple dualism 
of public versus private goods, it is possible to 
acknowledge that some goods can be consumed a finite 
number of times and some goods can be appropriated 
by a person and then excluded from others. These at-
tributes are recognised in the political-economy litera-
ture as subtractability and excludability (Hess & 
Ostrom, 2003).  When the attributes are contrasted 
against one another four distinct types of goods can be 
distinguished. These are contrasted in the 2x2 matrix 
below:  
 
   
Subtractability 
 
   
Low 
 
 
High 
 
Excludabil-
ity 
 
Difficult 
 
Public 
Goods 
Common 
Pool  
Resources 
 
Easy 
 
Club 
Goods 
Private 
Goods 
   Table 1: Types of Goods (Hess & Ostrom, 2003, p.120) 
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The possibility of excluding a good is a critical factor 
involved in whether or not a person can successfully 
appropriate and exchange it. Sometimes goods are pub-
lic, like the air that humans breathe, and are shared by 
default because they cannot be appropriated by a single 
individual. Others, like fishing stocks are shared be-
cause there is a cultural resistance to ownership by a 
single person, these are referred to as common-pool re-
sources.   A further category is ‘club’ goods which have 
a low subtractability because many people can interact 
with them, but they are easy to exclude from people, 
for example a cinema or a lecture theatre.  
 
The informal economy has received a large amount of 
attention wherever private goods have been concerned, 
but far less attention has been given to the way in which 
those same private transactions are made possible by 
more basic relationships between people and the ob-
jects they rely on.   Categories of goods influence the 
potential property rights that can be assigned to them. 
Indeed, property rights should be identified as involv-
ing not merely private ownership, but a hierarchical 
range of qualitatively distinct possibilities depending 
on the category of good to which they are assigned.  
This has been discussed at length by Ostrom & Hess 
(2007), who note a list of seven different property 
rights, although this varies widely depending on cul-
ture and legal systems. 
 
Property 
Right 
Definition 
Access The right to enter a defined physi-
cal area and enjoy non-subtractive 
benefits 
Contribution The right to contribute to content 
Extraction The right to obtain resource units 
or products of a resource system 
Removal The right to remove one’s artifacts 
from the resource 
Management 
/ Participa-
tion 
The right to regulate internal use 
patterns and transform the re-
source by making improvements 
Exclusion The right to determine who will 
have access, contribution, and re-
moval rights and how those rights 
may be transferred 
Alienation The right to sell or lease manage-
ment and exclusion rights 
Table 2: Types of property rights (Ostrom & Hess, 
2007, p.16) 
 
If we consider the previous lecture theatre example, for 
instance, a university may own the alienable right of 
outright ownership, but the exclusion right of the thea-
tre could simultaneously be appropriated by the SIM-
BIG conference management team, and conference at-
tendees could also simultaneously enjoy rights to con-
tribute to and access the theatre.   The important aspect 
of this arrangement is that property rights simultane-
ously overlap between stakeholders.  One change in the 
rights of one stakeholder can affect the qualitatively 
distinct rights of others.  The transformation of over-
lapping property rights is therefore an issue which in-
volves multiplexity.  Forms of measurement that in-
volve multiple simultaneous relations may best be un-
derstood as multi-layered networks. In network sci-
ence, multiplexity is the word used to describe how 
multiple overlapping relationships occur between a set 
of nodes.  Bliemel et al. (2014, p.370) note that ‘multi-
plexity occurs when multiple types of relationships 
overlap within the same set of actors, thus causing the 
relationships and actors to be interdependent’. 
3 Measuring informal economies 
through a network-centred approach: 
A preliminary sketch  
The position adopted here presupposes neither reci-
procity nor exchange across all areas of social interac-
tion. This is a small detail, but the methodological sig-
nificance is that individual acts may be observed as part 
of broader social structures without having to reduce 
explanation to either. What can be analysed instead are 
the property rights that overlap (through multiplexity) 
but are nonetheless separate in observable form.  If 
property rights are understood as a transitive quality of 
people and the collective institutions they form, this 
opens up possibilities to measure and examine the 
transformation of property rights throughout networks 
over time.    Network multiplexity adequately captures 
the nature of human economic relationships insofar as 
they are premised upon distinct, but nonetheless con-
tingent and interdependent, property relations between 
people. This is similar to what Appadurai (1988) pro-
posed by tracing the lifecycle of objects throughout an 
economy in order to reveal the way in which social 
structure is transformed:  
 
‘…we have to follow the things themselves, for their 
meanings are inscribed in their forms, their uses, their 
trajectories. It is only through the analysis of these tra-
jectories that we can interpret the human transactions 
and calculations that enliven things. Thus, even though 
from a theoretical point of view human actors encode 
things with significance, from a methodological point 
of view it is the things-in-motion that illuminate their 
human and social context.’  Appadurai (1988, p.5) 
 
The informal economy has historically presented vari-
ous methodological issues for quantitative analysis due 
to the lack of formal record or receipt during exchange, 
the absence of numerical balance in trade (i.e. cur-
rency), and the often deliberately subversive or illicit 
nature of informal exchange i.e. the activity is per-
formed surreptitiously in relation to monetised or reg-
ulated market economies. Thankfully, the technical de-
velopment of web technologies and the Internet have 
not only helped to facilitate new forms of informal 
economy but also provide the means to easily record, 
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and thus quantify at scale, the previously obscured eco-
nomic relations between people.  This is of interest for 
a variety of economic practices, particularly those that 
are mediated by the Internet, because longitudinal da-
tasets can be associated with non-monetary interac-
tions even in the absence of receipts.  They can there-
fore be analysed retrospectively for patterns of activity 
that emerge over time.   This is a novel and emerging 
form of inquiry but studies have already been com-
pleted for at least two popular websites including 
Couchsurfing (a service that allows people to share ac-
commodation – see Lauterbach et al., 2009) and for 
Streetbank (a service that encourages neighbours to 
give and share their belongings with each other – see 
Harvey, 2016). 
Longitudinal datasets can provide insight into where 
and when reciprocity occurs between donors and recip-
ients (direct reciprocity) and between networks of peo-
ple motivated to ‘pass it on’ (i.e. indirect reciprocity). 
This type of approach can begin to ask questions that 
anthropologists have arguably failed to answer, such as 
what specifically is ‘base’, ‘gifts’ or non-monetary 
economics when compared to markets, and should the 
two be separated for the purpose of analysis? Only 
through such an approach is it possible to critique the 
claims that human life is always premised on reciprocal 
forms. 
 
Anthropologists have on occasion attempted to incor-
porate graph theory into practical ethnographic re-
search (e.g. Hage & Harary, 1996).   A wide range of 
social scientists have also sought to use graph theory - 
and in particular forms of directed graphs - in order to 
model trust, friendships, alliances and communication 
networks to better understand human relations.  How-
ever, transference of property rights between people 
has received far less consideration and this may be due 
to influential ‘practice’ theory approaches that have 
taken precedence. For instance, the anthropologist 
Rodney Needham (1975) drew attention to the problem 
of categorising human activity through monothetic 
forms of classification and instead called for greater at-
tention to be given to polythetic forms of classification, 
that are fuzzier.  The point of polythetic classification 
is to help eliminate category errors.  For example, when 
an anthropologist observes a one-way transfer of mate-
rial wealth they should restrict themselves from think-
ing about the transfer as if it had a universal moral sta-
tus e.g. as a gift or as a bribe as experienced in their 
own respective lives.  This approach encourages re-
searchers to understand other people on their own 
terms and relate the action to a broader set of social 
facts.  The consequence of this is that research accounts 
are described in terms of incommensurable practices.  
This is a problem for any normative economic science 
because it removes the basis upon which to compare.   
In contrast to polythetic accounts of categorisation, the 
alternative described here is to recognise the ontologi-
cal basis of interaction – that people and goods are both 
essential.   There is a distinction between goods and the 
property rights that people assign to them, so it is im-
portant to recognise both in any analysis of economic 
relations.  The property rights that people assign to ob-
jects are transitive and can be passed between people 
in the case of exchange and giving, or rights can be 
granted to others without discrete transfers, such as in 
the case of sharing or access to common pool re-
sources.  Transferal of property rights occurs in both 
formal and informal economies and can be enacted by 
individuals or institutions i.e. groups of people acting 
in unison.  Examining direct and indirect reciprocity of 
property rights, rather than the goods themselves, pro-
vides an insight into whether interactions are premised 
on some form of balance or whether they are done for 
their own sake.  
 
One of the most promising approaches for examining 
property rights as graphs is the triad census.  This is 
also the most immediate empirical measure for a di-
graph containing direct and indirect forms of reciproc-
ity. For every possible triad of nodes in a directed net-
work there is a potential for 16 different types of con-
figuration. A triad census does not merely describe the 
nodes that interact through direct relationships, it also 
counts the nodes which are not active participants. It is 
this characteristic of the census which means that it can 
give an ‘overview’ of the structure of the network and 
the relationships that consistently emerge. According 
to Moody (1998, p.291) the triad census provides the 
most empirically direct way of measuring the way that 
‘individuals negotiate local relations and how those lo-
cal relations cumulate into structures. Researchers can 
test structural network hypotheses by comparing linear 
combinations of the triad census to that expected under 
a random or conditionally random.’   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1: Types of Triads (Batagelj & Mrvar, 2001) 
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A variety of formulae have been put forward by authors 
over the past forty years to test network hypotheses 
(e.g.Holland and Leinhardt 1970, 1976; Fersht-
man,1985; Snijders and Stokman, 1987), but this form 
of data collection exercise should not just result in 
straight-forward deductive testing of hypotheses.  In-
stead it should help inform abductive reasoning about 
how particular economies come into existence, persist 
or perish.  The prevalence of particular triads is illus-
trative of particular forms of economic relationship.  
For instance triad 10 is an instance of indirect reciproc-
ity, which would demonstrate that people primarily use 
a system to give and take. In contrast, intransitive rela-
tionships (such as triads 4 and 5) demonstrate imbal-
ance in the relationships between people.  These ques-
tions of empirical balance are closely related to ques-
tions of morality that have concerned economic anthro-
pologists since the beginning of the discipline.  But it 
is only through cross-cultural comparison of datasets 
that reciprocity hypotheses can be tested.   The collec-
tion and analysis of these relationships is impossible 
for the ethnographer, who may be able to interview and 
observe individual relationships at small scale. How-
ever, where organisations capture transactional data 
there is an opportunity for network scientists to analyse 
the social structure of economic relationships at scale, 
thus providing more insight than anthropologists alone. 
 
Considered by itself, the triad census shown above 
does not provide much insight. The census is used 
merely as a means of identifying the presence (or in-
deed absence) of particular triadic relations within the 
network and this subsequently can provide an empiri-
cal measure of transitivity. According to Kadushin 
(2012, p.25) statistical tests ‘are very supportive of the 
proposition that interpersonal choices tend to be tran-
sitive. Intransitive triads are very rare … Nonetheless, 
balance is only one theory about choice in a network 
and does have its limitations by postulating rigorous 
rules for relations that in messy social life do not al-
ways hold.’  
 
Transitivity is an interesting concept for examining in-
formal economies because it gives an insight into the 
relative proportion of the network that can be said to be 
balanced. However, for economic relations where a 
transfer of property takes place, these are unlikely to be 
of a similar nature to other human relations such as 
friendship or trust because excludability and subtracta-
bility are both constraining factors.  Indeed in work 
completed recently (Harvey 2016) this has been found 
to be the case for an informal website that encourages 
gift giving and sharing.    But very little attention has 
been paid to the effect this type of action has on the 
multiplexity of property rights, indeed it would require 
a complex and dynamic account of transformation.  
This is a huge opportunity for social network special-
ists and anthropologists to collaborate for a novel re-
search agenda, which can help to inform economic pol-
icy. As more of the economy becomes digitally-medi-
ated there is an increasing amount of data that can be 
used to analyse informal economies in ways previously 
impossible.   This wealth of data being created by 
emerging online services as part of the ‘sharing econ-
omy’ is predominately online and held by organisa-
tions.  This creates a challenge of access for research-
ers, but it also represents an opportunity, because those 
same organisations are often non-profit and depend 
upon support from policymakers.   If the social effects 
of new models are to be properly understood and com-
municated to policymakers there must be far greater 
scrutiny given to multiplex relationships and how they 
change through time. 
 
4 Why does this matter and what next? 
There are arguably three areas where a non-exchange 
centred form of measurement could help with norma-
tive social science for economics and/or anthropology: 
 
A) Many political decisions are made on the basis of 
aggregate accounts of exchange between people.  Alt-
hough simplistic, growth in exchange figures are gen-
erally viewed as positive e.g. GDP.  However, this 
lacks depth and fails to account for the way in which 
people actually provision for themselves.  Various au-
thors have drawn attention to the limitations of eco-
nomic growth (e.g. Schumacher, 1973; Jackson 2009) 
previously, but few have called for a fuller account of 
economics that includes non-exchange type relations 
between people. 
 
B) Resource dilemmas are a popular topic in econom-
ics in which researchers examine how people act (or 
fail to act) in cooperation when given shared access to 
a resource.  There has been a great deal of attention 
given to this area (e.g. Ostrom, 2011) but models rarely 
mention network multiplexity and the way it constrains 
or enables emergent property rights.  This absence rep-
resents an opportunity to bolster existing theory 
through experimental economics and ethnographic 
studies.  
 
C) Anthropologists often describe cultures in which le-
gal systems and property are fundamentally different 
from capitalist arrangements.   Some groups of people 
refuse to engage with private property or money due to 
metaphysical / ethical beliefs about the nature of the 
world and the status of humanity (e.g. Hutterites of 
North America – see Hostetler, 1967).  For anthropol-
ogists studying these types of culture an account of 
property rights that recognises network multiplexity 
would help to describe how g people actually enact 
communal property rights in order to maintain social 
cohesion.  
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Anthropologists seldom know the latest methodologi-
cal innovations in network science, but are well placed 
to understand the variations of property rights that peo-
ple all over the world experience in their day-to-day 
lives.   The scope for collaboration when measuring 
economies is enormous, particularly if a realist theory 
of property rights is combined with network measures 
of reciprocity, centrality, transitivity and is understood 
as a multiplex phenomenon.  The subject matter of this 
paper covers an abstract, and at times obscure, problem 
from economic anthropology, but the practical conse-
quences of economic measurement has an impact on us 
all.  Economic growth is measured solely in terms of 
exchange and this is used to justify political choices 
across the globe.   An approach that recognises the mul-
tiplexity of property rights can provide a fuller and 
more appropriate understanding of the way economies 
form, but this will require much greater collaboration 
between disciplines. 
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